intelligence cycle problems
In reality, it is not a cycle, but a series of parallel activities. The views expressed are those of the authors, and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense. The tasking itself is not the only way in which analysis can fail. The term “Process” or “Information Cycle” can be used indiscriminately since the nature of the Information activity is that of a cyclical process; which means that Intelligence management is a permanent and systematic process that does not have a definite term, due to the fact that the Information produced is the basis for further research activities. A common heritage for a common future. Link analysis charts and big data sifting didn't produce a "whack-a-mole" strategy…they're byproducts of that strategy. This sounds academic. Another setback in communication intelligence is code breaking. In the modern era, policy officials seem to want intelligenc… What if, instead, it presents us with increasingly complex patterns of correlation that we are increasingly ill equipped to contextualize? There is not enough disk space available on the NSX Intelligence appliance. This view includes information and insights about customers, competitors, problems, regulatory authorities, the potential for new products and any other market information you can guess. Yet, the fact that we have achieved so little while pursuing this track to date should give us pause. d. Chapter 4 explains intelligence support to joint operations. Other forms of bias such as cultural, organizational, or bias from the analysts self-interest and need to succeed. What accounts for our twenty-first-century inability to translate tactical excellence, technological dominance, and near-boundless resources into durable strategic outcomes in our post-9/11 âlong warâ? For example, the entrance to an underground bunker may be camouflaged with foliage and it would take an arduous examination of the image to find the information needed. The circuit is completed when decision makers provide feedback and revised requirements. [2] It is common to rely on technology when performing collection, however it can fail and cause more problems than it solves.[3]. No one, except our front-line personnel, has access to ground truth. Criminal Intelligence Manual for Analysts UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME Vienna United nations new York, 2011 ... the process of information-gathering itself became a problem, with a new need for more emphasis on new tasks and orders for information-gatherers created as a result of their new, Machine data integration is very good at immediate tactical representation but lousy at the deeper strategic context. The Irregular Warfare Podcast is Looking for a New Team Member. Our tactical-level representation of the enemy as a âPalantir Bonsai Treeâ (as opposed to as an organic outgrowth of local society) has become the intellectual framework for strategic decision-making. set goals and boundaries that are informed by policy, determine what resources are available, develop a timeline, understand how much risk the organization is willing to accept, and so on, in order to set the tone for the whole operation. We are asking data sets to explain what is happening on the battlefieldâbut the data itself has nothing to say. Our men and women on the ground are zeroed in on tactical intelligence about the enemyâthe who and where. Macro-level strategic debates cannot be allowed to proceed without connectivity to micro-level detail. The answers to those questions are what create information. In this respect, There is also the possibility of camouflage. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US government. The data is, in general, available to us all, but that means that we can easily stray from our lanes into other people's business when we should be focusing on providing context in a way that they don't have time to do for themselves. National level intelligence is where these root cause questions should be asked. the tactical analyst's job isn't to determine banking trends unless that points to a target that can be destroyed; similarly, the national-level analyst should not be focusing on finding the bed-down location of a bad guy unless it gives context to a wider analytic theme. Dramatic breakthroughs in the fields of big data, predictive analytics, and artificial intelligence are pulling us further and further toward a âdata-drivenâ understanding of the world. If the information is time sensitive but it is not disseminated in enough time to have the desired effect then the process fails. Instead of telling a story (like information does), intelligence paints a picture. Second, this enemy-focused lens has been transposed to the strategic level, with disastrous consequences. Again, I think this is a faulty assumption coming from someone in academia. This is management of the entire effort, from identifying the need fordata to delivering an intelligence product to a consumer. These problems may arise even from the beginning of the planning process due to the high strategic stakes of these operations, which sometimes involve highly sensitive intelligence held by one or more of the states engaged in operations. There are many ways to describe the intelligence cycle (or This poses a serious challenge to effective intelligence work. This process has developed systemic, structural flaws. Itâs all about turning data points into something that informs you about your business. The "Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Report to the President of the United States" found that there is a lack of analysts with the proper scientific or technological training needed to perform proper analysis, thus contributing to failure of analysis.[11]. Analysis. Nor is it proposing that we inject reams of speculative, unstructured, qualitative text into the intelligence cycle, or that we flood the intelligence community with academics. But patients don’t always stay within cultivated high-performing networks, creating quality and cost problems for even the best ACOs. The defense establishment, similar to any large organization engaged in complex operations in dynamic environments, likes quantitative data. What seems like a harmless conversation could prove dangerous. The syllabus of AI provides the students adaptation with the important technical and life skills for AI. Of course, we should not (and could not) disavow technology. It is, without question, the best-resourced military in human history. However, if it is important enough to report, how quickly should it be reported? Furthermore, the calls themselves may be encrypted as well, further complicating the problem. effi ciency of the intelligence cycle. e. Chapter 5 explains how understanding and intelligence support is enabled. This was the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) when President Kennedy needed only the actual number of pieces Failure in the intelligence cycle or intelligence failure, is the outcome of the inadequacies within the intelligence cycle. We excel at connecting the dots and mapping the network, but our view of the enemy is two-dimensional. Censorship controls over the internet in some countries will limit the amount of information that is made available. In a highly politicized environment where no one in the room has an intuitive feel for ground truth, and where qualitative context is largely absent from the intelligence cycle, the field is left open for mistaken assumptions, political manipulation, and old-fashioned careerist bullshitting.  Following the example of our most elite units, the ideal of âthe operatorâ has taken root among the men and women on the ground. However, the situation becomes complicated when the individuals begin to use "slang" or colloquialisms in their conversation. The facts on the ground must be integral to strategic debate, and they must be provided by the men and women on the front lines (rather than projected over data sets by rear-echelon analysts). Thirdly, the volume of data alone is often too much for an analyst to sift through causing important knowledge to slip by. Your email address will not be published. Thus leading to a failure in the intelligence itself. This is a complex deeply rooted Godel problem that can be mapped to asking incomplete questions and expecting a complete singular answer. Secondly, there is the issue of transmitted information being encoded. "[17] The problem with the traditional IC is that each stage is isolated where each part has a designated task. âEvery Soldier is a Sensor,â goes the mantra, but we have calibrated our sensors to maximize the uptake of reductive, quantitative data points, while we indulge the false humility that tactical-level personnel âare just gruntsâ and thus beneath the plane of strategic thinking. Much more resources are allocated to collection of information than to … Lastly, the exploitation, and analysis often take longer due to the need for highly trained analysts to examine the information. Berkowitz comments that, "The [traditional] intelligence cycle reflects the best thinking of how an information service should work from the late 1940s and 1950s. LINKAGES 6. It is a root cause of why we appear to be engaged in a never-ending game of whack-a-mole with our enemies. This involves understanding and articulating: 1. The problem within this step of the process is that there is often too much information and not enough analysts to process it. Analysts are the voice of the Intelligence Community. To thepublic, HUMINT remains synonymous with espionage and clandestineactivities, yet, in reality, most HUMINT collection is performedby It is clean. [8] There is a growing emphasis on the use of OSINT however, there are several points where collection via OSINT can fail. We provide analysis, strategic warning and threat assessment functions and manage the defence intelligence cycle, including coordination of defence intelligence requirements. Compartmentalization, either in isolation of planners from flow of intelligence or invocation of need to know among analysts, strongly contributes to failures in dissemination. Intelligence, like mathematics involves many systems of logic they are both interdependently related and interdependent with each other. Questions of strategic intelligenceâthe whyâare marginalized. Required fields are marked *. Yet our work must be executed with an ethnographerâs ear for meaning, and a historianâs eye for contextâand situated in an organizational culture where the collectors, producers, and consumers of intelligence possess a shared understanding of the limitations of quantitative data. A resource contention on the NSX Intelligence appliance occurred. This hinders the operational/long term issues by putting analysis of them off in favor of current issues. This is done through a variety of methods including decryption, language translation, and data reduction. Operators expect and desire to function on absolute facts arising from data in spite of reality that the "truth of perception problem" is inevitability always within a "Noise to Knowledge acquisition matrix and to base the intelligence cycle on any more narrowed formula is a misrepresentation and betrayal of the needs and expectations of the of the operational enterprise. Superficially, this is not an unexpected development. THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL Is a model for all areas of policing that ... n Allows more officers to focus on solving priority problems and targeting the most active offenders n Achieves greater compliance with Human Rights legislation and RIPA Thus important data may be cast aside and never used even though it may be relevant again at a later date. For an analyst listening to an intercepted phone call, the process of gaining information may seem simple. The rapidly growing size of our data streams is particularly dangerous in this respect. The goal of dissemination is simple, get the information that is relevant to the decision maker in a timely fashion while being accurate. Without the recognition of incongruence we are essentially allowing the system design of machine intelligence to make the decision when to pull triggers. f. Chapter 6 explains intelligence support to the joint operational planning process. The thematic elements of this article seem to be spot on. However, when confronting our recent strategic woesâfrom Afghanistan to Iraq and beyondâthe defense establishment must step forward to shoulder its share of the burden. Another potential failure is a satellite being unavailable at the time needed because it is being used for other intelligence purposes, and the situation or event of interest is missed. It does not indicate who or what may affect the completion of a step and the resources needed to begin the next step. The need to keep it from coming back can be found in the cyclic nature of its reoccurrence: WWII Strategic Bombing, Vietnam Era statistical analysts, modeling and control (command and control via spreadsheet by "Whiz Kids" ) and more recently all that waisted and counter productive RMA stuff. Matters of weather play a large role in IMINT failure. All organizations like to focus on their strengths. The prevailing currents in the defense sector, meanwhile, are pulling us further toward the extremes noted above. It is really not a very good description of the ways in which the intelligence process works." The idea that there is one best solution to any given problem is a mathematical fallacy. Yet this knowledge lacks depth and substance. The Modern War Institute does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Failure in analysis can be approached from two points of view: the tactical/operational point of view and the analysts point of view. The collection of intelligence is through five methods: Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Image Intelligence (IMINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), and Measures and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). The cycle is typically represented as a closed path of activities. It's not the intelligence cycle that's broken its the questions that are being asked of it. Operational intelligence is of limited life span and it to be used rapidly and is concerned with current events and capability. Processing includes the entering [4] While these systems have their strengths, such as the ability to intercept communication or to gain information about weapons systems, they also have their weaknesses. So basically the problem is the DoD CCRP and it's last remaining "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) project: Information Centric/Network Centric Warfare. Itâs also referred as experiential intelligence. Both approaches–data-driven and academic, qualitative and quantitative–are very important to providing quality intelligence support to operations and ultimately tactical, operational, and strategic mission accomplishment. Planning and direction – This is … The system development life cycle (SDLC) is a formal way of ensuring that adequate security controls and requirements are implemented in a new system or application. He also seems to assume that analysts in front-line units, such as those supporting "operators" or intensively involved in targeting, do not take an academic approach. Despite the lack of defined research on a wildland fire intelligence cycle, some value is apparent in its use, which indicates the need to evaluate the usefulness of use further for the wildland fire problem. Shop LG 4.5 Cu.Ft. The need to succeed coupled with the level of competition within the community to get their analysis on the desk of a top decision maker. The targeting process is a natural lens through which tactical elements of the military should view the world. The horizon-lowering influence of the twenty-four-hour news cycle. watch it and get knowledge. What the author describes as problems with the intelligence cycle (or intelligence in general) are not caused by intelligence information or the way it's collected and produced — they're the questions being asked. If you are viewing the paper of country where the dictator government runs the media, it is unlikely that you are reading an unbiased account of the facts. Another problem is stovepiping. We conceptualize the enemy in link analysis charts, and we strive to âconnect the dotsâ and generate actionable intelligence. Again, I suspect he does not know either cycle well enough to articulate how they interrelate, much less how one breaks the other. The author makes frequent assertions that decision makers and intelligence analysts have become overly reliant on data and technological solutions. The problem, however, is that quantitative data is reductive. Targeting is so much easier…. A quantitative data set cannot tell us anything about the significance of changing rates of violence, price fluctuations, or patterns of migration. The very bigness of our data imparts an illusion of understanding. According to Arthur S. Hulnick, author of What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle, "Collection and analysis, which are supposed to work in tandem, in fact work more properly in parallel. Hi viewers this channel is a completely educational channel. [12] These biases can occur not only with a single analyst but to an entire office of them, leading to a biased form of "groupthink". We break the battlefield down into measurable parts. [11] Therefore, the analysis that they perform is expected to be accurate on a regular basis. of raw data into databases where it can be exploited for use in the analysis process.[10]. The global reach of our targeting platforms is unprecedented and unmatched. This falls into two categories: verbal codes, and transmitted codes. * For a discussion of the downside to Corporate Americaâs infatuation with technology-driven solutions, see Sensemaking: The Power of the Humanities in the Age of the Algorithm, by Christian Madsbjerg (Hachette Books, 2017). A battalion intelligence officer's job isn't to determine what prime minister of country X is thinking. Budgetary and policy direction are hierarchically above it. JDN 1/10, Intelligence and Understanding has been subsumed into this We are able to track the enemy with a diverse and sophisticated suite of tools, fixing him in time and space, so that we might bring our exceptional lethality to bear. The status quo is a recipe for yet more unproductive tactical excellence. Our view of the fight at the tactical level, from counterterrorism operations in the Sahel to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, is structured around our view of the enemy. Put another way, the operational networks of our enemies are the framework through which we see the battlefield, and the targeting process is our lens. The Intelligence Cycle also fails to consider either counter-intelligence or covert action. Those parts are then measured by a diverse array of sensors. Looking ahead, the ability of technology to convey strategic understanding is central to our thinking about war and intelligence in the twenty-first century as well. This transfers to the analytic community as well. It is now the archetype of professional competency. As such, our strategic reliance on quantitative data to compensate for a paucity of substantive, qualitative understanding is dangerously misguided. It's not clear what evidence he has, other than a hunch, that intelligence analysts are not incorporating contextual data. The articles and other content which appear on the Modern War Institute website are unofficial expressions of opinion. Taken together, the United States wields a tactically, financially, and technologically superior warfighting machine. Any circular process is as weak as its weakest component. Most dramatically, technology has driven extraordinary advances in our targeting capabilities. Imagery intelligence refers to information gathered by planes, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and satellites. But what is needed other than ditching RMA is an unbiased and complete assessment of how it was created, why it failed and how to keep it from coming back. First, our current approach to network targeting takes an extremely limited view of the enemy. Your email address will not be published. The ability to invent new ideas and solutions when dealing with new situations is regarded as creative intelligence. Why do we have so little to show for it? need2share Should we kill the intelligence cycle? The aggregated, correlated data CAN and DOES provide essential clues and patterns that assist the analyst in coming to a specific conclusion or analytical judgment. The Ascendance of Technology and the Primacy of Targeting. Intelligence cycle was mainly prepared due Soviet threat. As a tool that has been perfected in the public sector, the cycle must adapt to private sector realities, including new consumers, new requirements, limited resourc-es, and, at the core, a new mission. Yet once we quantify something, stripping away its contextual meaning and turning it into a data point, it loses all of its explanatory power. It is a catastrophe at the strategic level, where it frames our worldview. A key part of the answer lies in what’s known as the “intelligence cycle”—the process through which we investigate, analyze, and decide to act upon the world around us. Our ability to leverage technology toward tactical objectives is already the driving force behind how we operate on the battlefield. Killing the enemy is the core business of the military. Open source information is derived from newspapers, journals, radio and television, and the Internet. The methods and the literature are open and available to us all, and both have much to offer in regard to our current challenges. They have fewer issues of failure, however their failures tend to be greater in magnitude. Price Match Guarantee. Problems with It's not "ground truth"…or at least, not more than a snapshot in time and space, regardless of how it's collected. It also suffers from finance issues due to the expensive nature of the items needed to do the actual collection itself. Our preoccupation with targeting, and our growing reliance on technology-driven quantitative analysis, have proceeded hand in hand with a shift in tactical-level organizational culture. The human component of analysis is just as important. We are present en masse from the front lines of conflict to the inner corridors of power. Elements of this capability will be tech-centric, as we continue to reap the extraordinary tactical advantages provided by technological innovation. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence have the potential to transform and empower the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) while simultaneously presenting unprecedented challenges from technologically capable adversaries. Instead, when strategic decisions are made (by men and women who are, inevitably, both physically and psychologically isolated from the front lines), debate takes place in a virtual reality that has been constructed by the intelligence cycleâand that may bear only a passing resemblance to the facts on the ground. But in fact, the way ahead is straightforward. One of the leading causes of analyst failure is cognitive bias. The allure of a high-tech, plug-in solution to understanding the world must be tempered by an appreciation of what technology and quantitative data can and cannot do. As front-line intelligence analysts have become consumed within the targeting process, strategic decision-makers have doubled-down on technology and data as a means to understand the battlefield. With fewer and fewer substantive, qualitative inputs into the intelligence cycle, we have compensated by harvesting ever-larger quantities of data. The question of "when is the moment to execute tactical actions and the expectations of why you shouldn't and/or don't need to" isn't being held accountable in systems. Fueled by our targeting prowess, this has fed into a growing anti-intellectualism. Big data, algorithmic processing, predictive analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence are the buzzwords of the day among our best and brightest. Our technological advantage is unprecedented, as cutting edge hardware and software platforms deliver extraordinary capabilities in areas ranging from SIGINT to targeting to command and control. Academics have cloaked the skill sets of academia (and of the social sciences in particular) in deliberately complex language, presenting them as things that require uniquely academic expertise. The Intelligence Cycle is a concept that describes the general intelligence process in both a civilian or military intelligence agency or in law enforcement. There is nothing to prevent us from demystifying and utilizing academic skills for ourselves, and integrating academic methods into front-line intelligence collection and analysis. Discover issues or problems; How business intelligence works. The zeitgeist tells us that the future lies with the large-scale quantification of the world around us, and we are following corporate Americaâs lead toward the technologization of everything.*. [7] Another problem with satellite imagery is that it is a simple snapshot in time. Gaining accurate communications intelligence can be achieved but more often than not, the adversary will not communicate in such a way that would allow the information to be intercepted easily. Ideally the tasking should be 50/50 so that no one type of issue gets more analysis than the other. A problem occurs when looking at current issues versus long-term issues. Unambiguous. On the other hand, technology will deliver an increasingly compelling illusion of situational understanding. It can also be encapsulated and released for pick up.[5]. A report on crop futures in Burkina Faso would not be of interest to the Secretary of Education for example. Future intelligence analysis, according to this vision, will be grounded in automated data collection and analysis platforms that deliver both tactical acuity and strategic clarity, harvesting and processing unfathomable quantities of data from sources as diverse as social media platforms, classified reporting databases, and weather satellites. This occurs when the decision maker fails to get the feedback to the analyst in a timely order that would assist in the production of the next report to them. On the battlefield, we can quantify and measure an extraordinary range of things, from incidences of violence to the price of bread to the movement of displaced people. This leads to large amounts of information that was collected never being utilized because it does not meet the exact needs for the collection requirement. Technology has been a driving force behind this phenomenon. Simple procedures can be taken to reduce the chances of information being received by a gathering method. We are not integrating a granular, nuanced understanding of localityâand the potential strategic implications thereofâinto the intellectual foundations of our strategic thinking. Find low everyday prices and buy online for delivery or in-store pick-up. This has corrupted our ability to root strategic thinking in the realities of the battlefield. However, a growing focus on targeting has drawn front-line attention away from deeper strategic concerns. Todayâs American military is, arguably, the most tactically adept fighting force in the worldâperhaps of all time. After all, claim denials are pricey. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Is an uptick in violence the result of the enemyâs growing strength? If the satellite that captures the image is not in a geo-synchronous orbit, there is a risk of the target not being there when the satellite passes over the area again. Lowenthal states in collection portion of his book that codebreakers like to boast that any code that can be created can be solved,[5] but the public has access to increasingly stronger cipher programs now[6] and these programs are harder to break.